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What role do local communities play in the making of international economic law? Does 
local cultural heritage and values matter in the adjudication of international economic 
disputes? Where there is a conflict between the objective of global economic liberalization 
and the pursuit of local cultural policies, should the local give way to the global? Like other 
branches of international law, international economic law treats each state as one unit and 
does not typically focus on the different subparts within states. As a result, local communities 
do not appear in the text of international economic law treaties. Only recently have local 
communities gradually emerged in the adjudication of international economic disputes. 
Despite their gradual appearance, they still remain significantly absent or marginalised in 
mainstream international economic law discourse. This chapter aims to fill this gap in legal 
literature investigating the impact of economic globalization on local communities and the 
role that local communities play in international economic law and adjudication. The clash 
between local cultural values and international economic governance is one example of the 
tension between international law and state autonomy and of the subsequent local adaptation 
of, and/or local resistance to, international law standards. It illustrates the challenge of 
implementing international law at the local level. 
Socio-legal approaches to international economic governance reveal that, 
substantively, a clash of culture can emerge between an international economic culture aimed 
at productivity and development and local cultural practices. Procedurally, international 
economic courts may not be the most appropriate tribunals for disputes adjudicating cultural 
heritage-related issues. After briefly discussing these findings, this chapter highlights two 
different yet complementary avenues for integrating local communities’ concerns into the 
fabric of international economic law. On the one hand, de lege ferenda, since international 
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investment treaties are renegotiated periodically, there is scope for inserting ad hoc clauses 
within these treaties to protect local communities. Analogously, World Trade Organization 
(WTO) law is not written in stone; rather, amendments and waivers are legal instruments to 
reconcile conflicting norms and interests. On the other hand, de lege lata, international 
economic courts can take into account local entitlements within the current framework of 
international economic law.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it explores the promises and pitfalls of socio-
legal analysis in international economic law. In fact, socio-legal approaches can illuminate 
the relevance of social factors in the creation and implementation of international economic 
law. Second, the concepts of local communities and cultural heritage as well as their interplay 
will be sketched out. Third, the international economic governance will be briefly described. 
Reference to the WTO
1
 and investment law regimes and their effective and sophisticated 
dispute-settlement mechanisms will be made. Fourth, the clash between local cultural values 
and international economic governance will be analysed and critically assessed. Finally, some 
conclusions shall be drawn. 
 
II. SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
 
In the past decades, international economic law has come to the fore, becoming a 
sophisticated field of academic study and legal practice. The move from the periphery to the 
core of public international law has required the use of various methods of inquiry to map the 
field. Among these various methods, ranging from law and economics
2





 to global administrative law,
5
 only recently have socio-legal approaches 
made their way into international economic law.
6
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While socio-legal approaches are not the sole – let alone the ultimate – method for 
investigating international economic law (IEL), they contribute to illuminate this field of 
study. Socio-legal approaches can “offer valuable insights into IEL and broade[n] our 
understanding of social factors involved in the creation and implementation of IEL rules”.7 
They can also have “implications for policy-making”, and “suggest some better mechanisms 
for coping with the modern challenges faced by IEL”.8 
Socio-legal approaches to international economic law acknowledge that international 
economic activities and their regulation are social phenomena and have pervasive effects on 
everyday life.
9
 As traders and investors “cross boundaries”, “settle in new communities” and 
commercialize their products and services, international trade and foreign direct investments 
spread “knowledge, norms, and values”.10 Not only do socio-legal approaches investigate 
legal provisions, but they also examine the contexts in which legal texts operate.
11
 In fact, 
international economic law is much more than the mere sum of its provisions.
12
 Socio-legal 
approaches to IEL explore the role that both public and private actors play in international 
economic relations considering economic interactions as “part and parcel of social life”.13 
Like other “law and …” linkages, the link between law and society can be a fertile one, 









 and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
17
 in the making of 
global economic governance, very little attention has been paid to local communities. For 
centuries, law has consisted of the state law, and public international law has consisted of the 
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 International economic law was no exception to this state-centric 
approach. While states remain an important focus of international economic law, state sub-
units have increasingly participated in international economic law regimes. In parallel, 
international economic law has a pervasive character, having an impact on the life of local 
communities. Moreover, current global economic trends can be fostered or resisted by local 
cultural aspirations. This chapter contributes to the emerging literature shedding light on the 
interplay between local communities and global economic governance. Due to space limits, it 
has an exploratory character. 
 
III. WHY DO LOCAL COMMUNITIES MATTER? 
 
Local communities can be defined as groups of individuals, living in a common location and 
organized around common values. “Local” indicates the fact that these communities are 
rooted in a “particular contexts of experience”.19 The word “community” derives from the 
Latin communitas (comprising cum, meaning “with/together”, and munus, meaning “duty”)20 
and refers to a social group and its “syste[m] of interests, values or beliefs”.21 Local 
communities are characterized by different types of links. Local communities are the first 
ambit in which human beings connect, they count for most in the daily lives of people, and 
create a sense of identity.  
Local communities are not legal subjects of international law, as states formally 
remain the only subjects of international law.
22
 If local communities by definition are not 
subjects of international law, why should they matter to international economic law 
discourse? If one accepts the conception of international economic law as a branch of 
international law aimed at fostering peaceful and prosperous relations among nations for the 
commonweal of the international community, then local communities matter because they are 
the social units or building stones of the international community itself. According to this 
view, international economic law would be rooted in, and express the aspirations of, the 
international community as a whole. 
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Exploring the human dimension of international economic law requires scholars not 
only to focus on macroeconomic notions of growth but also to consider the impact that 
international economic activities and their regulation have on the commonweal. In other 
words, “balancing economic and wider social – non-economic – values and interests requires 
that we no longer naturally exclude the latter from our conceptions of international economic 
law, and that we re-evaluate the values inherent to international economic law”.23 The very 
text of international economic law instruments refers to non-economic values.
24
 For instance, 
the preamble to the WTO stresses the importance of “raising standards of living” and 
“sustainable development”.25 Therefore, the WTO should not be exclusively identified with 
trade liberation in goods and services; rather “liberalization is a means to an end, and not an 
end in itself”.26 
Even accepting the idea that local communities matter, and that international 
economic law should have a human face, states remain the interlocutors, makers and subjects 
of international economic law. States sign international treaties and have to comply with 
international law commitments. States represent their population, and a fortiori, also local 
communities. Why then should analysis focus on local communities as sub-units of states? 
What is the added value of focusing on local communities?  
In most cases, states have filed claims before international economic law tribunals to 
defend key interests of their local communities. For instance, in the recent seal products 
dispute before the WTO panel and Appellate Body, Canada vigorously defended the 
economic and cultural interests of its coastal communities, in practising seal hunting and 
commercializing seal products, that had been affected by the EU ban on seal products.
27
 In 
the Glamis Gold arbitration, concerning the development of a gold mine in California, the 
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United States vigorously and successfully defended the cultural interests of the indigenous 
tribes in protecting sacred sites.
28
 
However, “States rarely comprise one homogenous legal culture”, and people living 
in a state can be divided into different groups because of economic, social and cultural 
reasons.
29
 In certain cases, states and given local communities may have diverging interests. 
While states may pursue aggressive developmental policies, local communities affected by 




IV. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE  
 
International economic law is a well-developed field of study and is characterized by 
sophisticated dispute-settlement mechanisms. While the dispute-settlement mechanism of the 
WTO has been defined as the “jewel in the crown” of this organization,31 investment treaty 




The creation of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) determined a major shift 
from the political consensus-based dispute-settlement system of the GATT 1947 to a rule-
based architecture designed to strengthen the multilateral trade system.
33
 The WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism (DSM) is compulsory, exclusive and highly effective.
34
 Panels and 
the Appellate Body interpret and apply the WTO treaties, preserving the rights and 
obligations of the WTO members.
35
 Their decisions are binding on the parties, and the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
36
 provides remedies for breach of WTO law. Only 
WTO member states have locus standi in the DSM, i.e. individuals cannot file claims before 
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panels and the Appellate Body.
37
 When trade disputes emerge, Article 23.1 of the DSU 
obliges Members to subject the dispute exclusively to WTO bodies.
38
 
In parallel, as there is no single comprehensive multilateral investment agreement, 
investors’ rights are defined by a plethora of international investment agreements, customary 
law and general principles of law. International investment law provides extensive protection 
to investors’ rights in order to encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) and to foster 
economic development. At the substantive level, investment treaties provide for, inter alia: 
adequate compensation for expropriated property; protection against discrimination; fair and 
equitable treatment; full protection and security; and assurances that the host country will 
honor its commitments regarding the investment. At the procedural level, investment treaties 
provide investors direct access to an international arbitral tribunal. The use of the arbitration 
model is aimed at depoliticizing disputes, avoiding potential national court bias and ensuring 
the advantages of confidentiality and effectiveness.
39
 Arbitral tribunals review state acts in 
the light of their investment treaties. 
 Given the structural imbalance between the vague and non-binding dispute-settlement 
mechanisms provided by international treaties protecting various types of cultural heritage,
40
 
on the one hand, and the highly effective and sophisticated dispute-settlement mechanisms 
available under international economic law, on the other, cultural disputes involving 
investors’ or traders’ rights have often been brought before international economic law fora.41 
One may wonder whether the fact that cultural disputes tend to be adjudicated before 
international economic law fora determines a sort of institutional bias. Treaty provisions can 
be vague and their language encompasses a potentially wide variety of state regulation that 
may interfere with economic interests. Therefore, a potential tension exists when a state 
adopts regulatory measures interfering with foreign investments or free trade, as regulation 
may be considered as violating substantive standards of treatment under investment treaties 
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or the WTO covered agreements and the foreign investor may require compensation before 
arbitral tribunals or spur the home state to file a claim before the WTO organs.  
More specifically, with regard to the WTO DSB, “it is quite uncontroversial that an 
adjudicatory system engaged in interpreting trade-liberalizing standards would tend to favor 
free trade”.42 According to some empirical studies, there is a consistently high rate of 
complainant success in WTO dispute resolution
43
 and authors have theorized that “the WTO 
panels and the WTO Appellate Body have interpreted the WTO agreements in a manner that 
consistently promotes the goal of expanding trade, often to the detriment of respondents’ 
negotiated and reserved regulatory competencies”.44 In particular, given the fact that about 80 
percent of the cases have been settled in favor of the claimant, Colares highlighted that “the 
DSB has evolved WTO norms in a manner that consistently favors litigants whose interests 
are generally aligned with the unfettered expansion of trade”.45 
In the parallel domain of investor–state arbitration, some scholars contend that such 
mechanism is biased in favor of corporate and economic interests, and “excludes 
consideration of vital non-commercial interests”.46 Certainly, given the architecture of the 
arbitral process, significant concerns arise in the context of disputes involving local 
communities and their cultural concerns. While arbitration structurally constitutes a private 
model of adjudication, investment disputes present public law aspects.
47
 Arbitral awards 
ultimately shape the relationship between the state, on the one hand, and private individuals, 
on the other.
48
 Arbitrators determine matters such as the legality of governmental activity, the 




Investor–state arbitration, however, distinguishes between two types of non-state 
actors: (1) foreign investors; and (2) the FDI impacted-local communities.
50
 International 
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investment treaties generally delegate the resolution of disputes arising from the investment 
within the territory of the host state to an international dispute-settlement mechanism, thus 
bypassing national courts.
51
 Furthermore, court decisions in the host state upholding 
complaints brought by private parties against a foreign investor may be challenged by the 




The increasing impact of FDI on the social sphere of the host state has raised the 
question of whether the principle of access to justice, as successfully developed to the benefit 
of investors through the provision of binding arbitration, ought to be matched by a 
corresponding right to a remedial process for local communities adversely affected by the 
investment in the host state.
53
 While the recognition of multinational corporations (MNCs) as 
“international corporate citizens” has progressed,54 by comparison, the procedural rights of 
local communities have remained unchanged. The following section addresses the question as 
to whether cultural entitlements play any role in the context of international disputes before 
international economic fora. 
 
V. A CLASH OF CULTURES?  
 
Culture represents inherited values, ideas, beliefs and traditions which characterize social 
groups and their behaviour. Culture is not a static concept but rather a dynamic force, which 
evolves through time and shapes countries and civilizations. As such, culture has always 
benefited from economic exchange. International trade in recent times has spurred a more 
intense dialogue and interaction among nations: thus, it offers unprecedented opportunities 
for cultural exchange. In parallel, FDI can promote cultural diversity and provide the funds 
needed to locate, recover and preserve cultural heritage. 
Nonetheless, economic globalization can also jeopardize cultural diversity and 
determine the erosion of cultural heritage. While states actively compete for FDI and 
liberalize trade to promote growth, foster competition and attract transfers of technology, FDI 
and trade can affect the cultural heritage and deeply held cultural practices of local 
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communities. While trade in cultural products can lead to cultural homogenization, certain 
investments, such as those in the extractive sector, have the ultimate capacity to change 
landscapes and erase memory. 
Despite its significant relationship to international economic law, culture receives 
very limited attention in the text of trade and investment treaties. In the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT),
55
 two provisions address cultural matters. Article IV 
GATT allows WTO member states to establish screen quotas – i.e. policies requiring a 
minimum number of screening days of domestic movies each year to protect the national film 
industry – by exempting cinematographic films from the national treatment principle. Article 
XX(f) GATT allows member states to adopt or enforce measures to protect “national 
treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value”. Nonetheless, the restrictive 
requirements of the introductory part (chapeau) of Article XX have de facto limited the 
successful application of Article XX of GATT 1994. Notoriously, the chapeau of Article XX 
requires that the measures restricting trade must not be applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, and they must not constitute a disguised restriction on international 
trade.  
In international investment law, discussions about a cultural exception were pivotal to 
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) negotiations. At the time, France and 
Canada had pursued the insertion of an exception to enable all parties to protect cultural 
diversity and enterprises engaged in cultural activities. The United States’ opposition to such 
a clause, however, could not be overcome and the whole project ultimately failed.  
This was not the end of “cultural exceptions” – the idea to treat cultural goods and 
services differently from commercial products and consider them as exceptions – in 
international investment law. Some international investment agreements present ad hoc 
provisions protecting relevant communities and/or their cultural interests. For instance, in the 
Annex of the US–Lithuania bilateral investment treaty (BIT), Lithuania reserved “the right to 
make or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment” with regard to, inter alia, 
“monuments of nature, history, archaeology and culture as well as the surrounding protective 
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areas”, and the land of the Curonian Spit – a landscape of sand dunes that is a World Heritage 
site.
56
 More recently, the Trans-Pacific Partnership stipulates that: 
 
<quotation>[p]rovided that such measures are not used as a means of arbitrary or 
unjustified discrimination against persons of the other Parties or a disguised 
restriction on trade in goods, trade in services and investment, nothing in this 
agreement shall preclude the adoption by New Zealand of measures it deems 
necessary to accord more favourable treatment to Maori in respect of matters covered 





Until recently, international economic law had developed only limited tools for the 
protection of cultural heritage through dispute settlement. Cases like UPS v Canada
58
 show 
that the existence of a cultural exception can facilitate the consideration of cultural concerns 
in international economic disputes. However, in the absence of a cultural exception, it seems 
more difficult to integrate cultural concerns into the fabric of international economic law.
59
 
Finding the proper balance between the need of investors and traders “for the rule of law” and 
due process, on the one hand, and states’ desire to preserve their policy space to pursue their 
legitimate interests, on the other, is the key challenge that international economic law faces 
“in the interest of its own legitimacy”.60 
 
VI. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
 
Socio-legal approaches to international economic law reveal the interplay between local 
communities and global economic governance. Not only are local communities “important 
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sources and carriers of identities”,61 they also constitute “powerful units of analysis” because 
they “bring human beings to the centre of the analytical frame”.62 “Community lenses” 
applied to international economic law can contribute to the theoretical study of the field and 
suggest paths for improvement.
63
 Socio-legal approaches reveal that, substantively, a clash of 
culture can emerge between an international economic culture aimed at productivity and 
development and local cultural practices. Procedurally, international economic fora may not 
be the most appropriate tribunals for disputes adjudicating cultural heritage-related issues. 
After briefly discussing these findings, this section proposes two avenues for facilitating the 
consideration of local communities’ entitlements in international economic disputes: 1) a 
text-driven approach; and a 2) judicially driven approach. 
At the substantive level, FDI and trade can have both positive and negative effects on 
the lives of local communities. Among the positive spillovers there is economic growth, 
competition, knowledge transfers and well-being. Development analysts point to trade and 
extractive projects as anti-poverty measures, and advocate trade and FDI as major catalysts 
for development.
64
 However, “for the most part, the peoples in the areas where the resources 
are located tend to bear a disproportionate share of the negative impacts of development 
through reduced access to resources and direct exposure to pollution and environmental 
degradation”.65 
At the procedural level, arbitral tribunals constitute an uneven playing field: while 
foreign investors have locus standi – i.e. the right to act or be heard – before these tribunals, 
local communities do not have direct access to these dispute-settlement mechanisms. Rather, 
their arguments need to be espoused by their home government. Nonetheless, for a variety of 
reasons, states do not always adequately represent local communities.
66
 In fact, the cultural 
entitlements of local communities often compete with the economic development plans of 
both investors and states. Therefore, despite the formal premise of equality between the 
parties, there are structural power asymmetries between MNCs and local communities that 
governments may not mitigate. Not only does investor–state arbitration fail to take into 
account the eventual conflict of interest between the cultural entitlements of local 
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communities and the economic needs of the state, but it also confers distinct procedural 
advantages to foreign investors vis-à-vis other private actors.  
While local communities can (and have) present(ed) friends of the court (amicus 
curiae) briefs reflecting their interests, investment tribunals and the WTO panels and 
Appellate Body are not legally obligated to consider such briefs – rather, they have the 
faculty to do so should they deem it appropriate.
67
 The requests are granted if the friends of 
the court can demonstrate that they could assist tribunals without unduly delaying 
arbitrations.
68
 As amici curiae, local communities cannot ask for final or interlocutory 
remedies to preserve their cultural entitlements before arbitral tribunals and the WTO DSM.  
Moreover, investors’ and traders’ claims “are adjudicated faster, sooner, and with 
greater potential for immediate state liability” than the claims of local communities before 
domestic courts.
69
 Furthermore, “any strictly pecuniary quantification of damages is likely to 
favour foreign investors” and traders at the expense of the competing interests of local 
communities.
70
 In fact, mere pecuniary valuation may not accord significant weight to 
“permanent alterations to landscape” or change of lifestyle.71 Finally, the fear of costly 
litigation can prevent states from protecting the entitlements of local communities 
determining a regulatory chill.
72
 
Two avenues can facilitate the consideration of local communities’ entitlements in 
international economic disputes: (1) a “treaty-driven approach”; and (2) a “judicially driven 
approach”.73 First, the text-driven approach relies on the periodical renegotiation of the 
international economic law acquis. As international investment treaties are renegotiated from 
time to time, treaty drafters can expressly accommodate local communities’ entitlements in 
the text of these treaties.
74
 Analogously, WTO agreements are not written in stone; rather, 
rounds of negotiations regularly take place, and WTO members have adopted amendments 
and/or interpretative statements to better accommodate non-trade concerns into the fabric of 
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 Mihail Krepchev, “The Problem of Accommodating Indigenous Land Rights in International Investment 
Law” (2015) 6 J Int’l Disp Settlement 42 at 43–4. 
73







 For instance, renegotiation of international investment agreements might take 
account of the requirements of free prior informed consent and benefit sharing. Such 
requirements, which have been developed in the context of indigenous peoples’ rights, could 
be extended to other social groups, enabling local communities to participate in the decision-
making that can affect them and share the benefits that derive from given economic activities. 
In parallel, investors should take into account the existence of protected groups when 
assessing the economic risks of the given investment
76
 and consider incorporating local 
communities as part of multi-actor contracts.
77
 
Second, the judicially driven approach relies on the interpretation and application of 
international economic law by arbitral tribunals, WTO panels and the Appellate Body (AB). 
International economic courts can take into account local entitlements within the current 
framework of international economic law.
78
 Arbitral tribunals, WTO panels and the AB are 
tribunals of limited jurisdiction and lack the jurisdiction to hold states liable for breach of 
their human rights obligations. Rather, they can only determine whether the protections in the 
relevant investment treaty or WTO covered agreements, respectively, have been breached.  
However, this does not mean that human rights should be irrelevant in the context of 
investment disputes. Arbitral tribunals, WTO panels and the AB can and should interpret 
international economic law in conformity with jus cogens
79
 and a state’s obligations under 
the United Nations Charter.
80
 Some norms protecting human rights have acquired jus cogens 
status, such as the prohibitions of racial discrimination and of genocide. Moreover, 
international economic law is not a self-contained regime, but constitutes an important field 
of international law. As such, it should not frustrate the aim and objectives of the latter, 
which include the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as expressed, inter 
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alia, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
81
 the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
82
 and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR).
83
 Rather, international economic courts should interpret international 
economic law taking into account “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties”.84 
Several international human rights rules refer to collective values and cultural 
entitlements. These provisions include both hard law and soft law.
85
 Examples of binding 
cultural entitlements abound. For instance, Article 1 of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR 
recognizes the right of self-determination, i.e. the peoples’ right to “freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.86 The 
same provision also clarifies that international economic cooperation is “based upon the 
principle of mutual benefit, and international law” and that “in no case may a people be 
deprived of its own means of subsistence”.87 Significantly, the principle of self-determination 
is commonly regarded as a jus cogens rule. For example, Article 27 of the ICCPR recognizes 
the individual right of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities “to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language”, 
“in community with the other members of their group”. This provision is binding on the 
parties to the ICCPR.  
There are even more instances of non-binding cultural entitlements. For instance, 
Article 27(1) of the UDHR states that “Everyone has the right freely to participate in the 
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits”.88 Indigenous culture plays a central role in the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).
89
 Although neither the UDHR nor the UNDRIPare 
binding, and therefore include soft law norms, they can coalesce in customary international 
law and therefore become binding. 
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In conclusion, while international economic law does not give too much attention to 
culture, at least when it comes to texts of the WTO covered agreements and international 
investment agreements, and therefore international economic courts have limited or no 
specific mandate to protect cultural entitlements, such entitlements are a significant 
component of human rights law.,  Arguably, provisions such as Article 27 of the UDHR, 
which provides the right of individuals to freely participate in the cultural life of the 
community and to enjoy and share cultural life, can influence the interpretation and 
application of international economic law. This is even more the case with regard to cultural 




The clash between local cultural values and international economic governance is one 
example of the tension between international law and state autonomy and of the subsequent 
local adaptation of, and/or local resistance to, international law standards. FDI and free trade 
can represent a potentially positive force for development. Still, state policy and practice 
concerning economic activities must be mindful of its implications for the culture of local 
communities. The interplay between the promotion of free trade and FDI, on the one hand, 
and the protection of local cultural heritage, on the other, highlights a fundamental clash 
between local and global dimensions of governance. Heritage is local and belongs to specific 
places and local communities: economic governance has an international character. At the 
same time, both foreign investments and international trade can affect the traditional lifestyle 
and cultural values of local communities.  
Disputes involving the conflict between the protection of cultural heritage and the 
promotion of economic freedoms have been brought before international economic fora. 
International economic fora may not be the most suitable fora to settle this kind of dispute. 
They are courts of limited jurisdiction, and cannot adjudicate on state violations of local 
communities’ entitlements. This does not mean, however, that they should (or do) not take 
cultural considerations into account. Rather, international economic courts ought to hear the 
voices of these communities.
90
 
This chapter highlights two different yet complementary avenues for integrating local 
communities’ concerns into the fabric of international economic law. On the one hand, de 
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lege ferenda, since international investment treaties are renegotiated periodically, there is 
scope for inserting ad hoc clauses within these treaties to protect local communities. 
Analogously, WTO law is not written in stone; rather, amendments and waivers are legal 
instruments to reconcile conflicting norms and interests. On the other hand, de lege lata, 
international economic courts can take into account local entitlements within the current 
framework of international economic law. 
